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The U.S. Military as an Informational Environment1
Eric C. Jones
Department of Anthropology
University of Georgia
Abstract
The historical development of military organization in the United States has been strongly influenced by the
desire to make more precise information available to decision-makers at appropriate levels in the chain of
command for national security and warfare. By placing the U.S. military in national and international
contexts, this paper proposes that its historical development results from the complex informational needs
critical to the political-economic evolution of the State. Specifically, technology, strategy, chain of command
and battlefield tactics increasingly require improvements in information quantity, quality and analysis.

Can a system designed for achieving and maintaining a long-term political consensus also make and carry
out decisions inevitably marked by urgency, secrecy, and often contention? . . . Can any U.S. institution long
survive which lies outside the consensus?
–Schmitt 1986:282-3

Introduction
The objective of this paper is to give a preliminary analysis of the role of information in the
development of the military. The military is examined as an informational environment within a
human ecosystem. An informational environment
contains potential physical, biological, social and
cultural sources of information, as well as relevant
actors who manipulate and potentially produce
varying qualities of information (see Casagrande,
this volume). The position of the military within
such an informational environment is primarily
due to its status as a fundamental institution in
the modern Nation State. While the specific example used here is the U.S. military, the scope of
analysis is broad and general, and might be applied

to military institutions in other times and places.
The centrality of the military to social organization in the U.S. is often noted, but little understood. Past explanations have characterized the
military simply as a capitalist tool, or as necessary
for national security, tending to ignore the role of
information in its development. An alternative
approach examines the existence, construction and
maintenance of informational boundaries. Historically, these boundaries range from the development
of civilian/military distinctions to intra-service
(enlisted/officer) and inter-service (Marines/Air
Force) distinctions of identity, which constrain
potential information transmission.
Here I briefly trace the development of the
U.S. military as related to complex informational

This paper carries over ideas developed in Charles R. Peters’ seminar in Information Ecology held at the University of
Georgia in 1997. Some of these threads were developed further in Peters’ 1998 Complex Systems and 1998 Information
Ecology II seminars. While the author is solely responsible for oversights, Charles Peters, Felice Wyndham, David Casagrande, Suzanne Joseph, Rick Stepp, George Luber, Rebecca Zarger and Warren Roberts have all made useful contributions.
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needs in the evolution of the State. First, a history
of U.S. military intelligence activities provides a
background for understanding the role of information in the modern State. Next, the U.S. military’s connections to external environments (e.g.,
geopolitical, economic, biophysical) are placed in
a systems perspective. This is followed by an enumeration of military functions, and remarks on
cross-cultural and cross-temporal developmental
tendencies. I conclude with an overview of the
internal workings of U.S. military intelligence.
History of U.S. Military Intelligence
At the beginning of the 20th century, the
United States had virtually no centralized body to
coordinate military intelligence activities. American beliefs in pluralism and decentralization limited the possibility for such centralized coordination
(Powe 1973). Nonetheless, a powerful structure
for acquiring and analyzing information now exists
in the United States; one which emphasizes both
hierarchy and flexibility; the former for efficiency
in command, the latter for unexpected events or
the exploitation of unconventional information
sources.
Technology for communication and intelligence, especially mapping, has had a cumulative
effect in the organization of the military, creating
specific military and non-military branches of intelligence. Although localized tactical intelligence
has been demonstrated by American commanders
in all wars, the Civil War demonstrated a lack of
coherence in military intelligence on both sides
(Powe 1973). Informational improvements in
the ability to command troops during the Civil
War were made possible by the technologies of
the railroad, hot air balloon and telegraph. These
improvements withered during the post-war era,
and as with previous wars, there was little peacetime
follow-up of wartime organizational developments.
For example, it was not until the 1880s that the U.S.
dispatched permanent foreign military attachés, after
military leaders visited Europe and brought back an
interest in military staff organization.
At the turn of the century the middle class in
the United States began to seek power and leadership through management skill and technology
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(Powe 1973). This was expressed in ‘scientific’
management, bureaucratization, centralization,
and an emphasis on expertise as the appropriate
impetus for social change. Along these lines, Major
General Ralph H. Van Deman helped create the
Military Intelligence Section of the War College
Division during WWI. His vision was of a professional intelligence service:
The most necessary and essential kind of
information, the information without which no
war plan can be made that is worth the paper it
is written on, does not come in of its own accord
or as a matter of routine. It must be actively
sought, traced out, and proved up. (Van Deman,
in Weber 1988:141)

Van Deman, in those formative years, always
sought to maintain the separation of military
intelligence activities from strategic military activities. He envisioned the Military Intelligence
Section as an agency responsible for the centralization of information and analysis (Table 1), as
a separate institution accountable directly to the
war chiefs of staff, and separate from the heads of
planning, supplies, operations, etc. (Powe 1973;
Thomas 1986).
Since WWII, civilian control over intelligence apparati has waxed and waned a number of
times. Formalized in 1947, congressional control
of intelligence included the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), emerging from the
WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The
1950s and 1960s were characterized by congressional deference to executive initiatives concerned
with foreign policy. In 1974, Congress bounced
back, reacting to CIA covert actions. Congress
placed covert actions under presidential control and
demanded notification. This period of imposing
restraint on intelligence activities was followed by
one of restricted Congressional influence, requiring
notification of only two Congressional committees
before action instead of eight, and prohibiting the
press from publishing the names of any intelligence
officer (Schmitt 1986; Allard 1991).
Present distribution of resources in military
intelligence is uneven. Loch Johnson asserts that
material technology’s evolving role in U.S. military
intelligence is evidenced by the fact that the CIA
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Table 1: Early U.S. Military Intelligence Activities (Powe 1973).

and the other twelve U.S. Intelligence Agencies
are “ . . . bloated bureaucracies, overly reliant on
technology and in need of a game plan for the
post-Cold War era . . .” (cited in Koppes 1998:6).
He argues that we should aim for a 2:1 spending
ratio of technology to people. Presently the ratio
is 7:1. This lopsided distribution of resources
can be traced to political influences; for example,
the emphasis on data-gathering techniques. The
president, as civilian head of government, checked
by Congress, often appears to have no choice but
to follow the dictates of the military-industrial
complex. White House staff organization is a key
for a president to affect distribution of resources
for intelligence activities by Congress (Lord 1988).
However, the influence of politics on distribution
of resources partially depends on the presidential
style of management. A strong, activist president
can make these agencies and the National Security
Council serve his/her needs to a greater extent. The
National Security Council (NSC) has a number of
responsibilities aimed at strategic planning. The
NSC answers directly to the president, who then
issues directives or proposes legislation regarding
the structure of the intelligence community. The
informational responsibilities delegated to the

National Security Council’s policy groups now
include routine staff support and information,
crisis management, policy development, policy
implementation, policy advice and operations
(Lord 1988:63).
One of the classic public concerns in the
U.S. has been with the role of secrecy and intelligence in public and private life. Citizens cannot
perform their democratic responsibilities if ignorant, and Congress cannot fulfill its constitutional
responsibilities if it is lacking military information.
Self-restraint was encouraged for the press during
WWI (largely ineffectual) and heavily pushed
during WWII2 , starting eight days after war was
declared on Germany. However, censorship of the
press predates the country’s independence3. For
management of press access to government and
intelligence information, presidents Truman and
Eisenhower created the categories: ‘top secret;’
‘secret;’ ‘confidential;’ etc.–classifications of government data for managing information at the source
(Wiggins 1956:101). By the present decade, as
demonstrated during the Gulf War, the press has
seen even more restrictions and opted for even
more self-restraint, unlike in the Vietnam War.

Roosevelt’s announcement claimed: 1) the necessity of withholding some of the news where it originates; 2) the necessity
of guarding the nation’s borders to not allow information to reach the enemy; 3) the necessity of prohibiting publication
of some information even within the U.S.; and 4) the importance of conformity by the press and radio to abstain from
revealing certain details, such as troop and carrier movements (Wiggins 1956:97).

2
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Military Functions
Modern military functions can best be seen
in a simplified case study, presented here in the
form of graphic models to illustrate the players
and relationships in these military systems. Building on this, comparisons can then be made with
prior social forms of military-like behavior and
forms of warfare that have evolved in the past few
thousand years.
The United States of America’s Warpath
Figure 1 is a triptych that depicts the relationship between function and development of
the military in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s,
and introduces some of the players in the multiple
environments (physical, biological, social, cultural)
external to the military. The U.S. government
interacts with the rest of the world through the
‘western system of alliances.’ This inevitably leads
to war, wartime production, and martial law (three
panels on left of Figure 1), and eventually back to
the ‘balance of power’ for a new cycle. It is important to understand the place of the U.S. military
in national and international politics in terms of
these continual pressures.
With regard to the preeminent nature of
warfare, Martin van Creveld has noted that:

Vol. 3 1999

. . . in order to explain the occurrence of war,
it is not necessary to postulate the existence of
any ulterior objectives other than war itself.
(1991:215)
To repeat, the true essence of war consists not just
of one group killing another, but of its members
readiness to be killed in return if necessary.
(1991:221)

From an evolutionary point of view, this
aspect of tribal warfare does not seem to have
changed much when war was bureaucratized, or
further rationalized, as chiefdoms or states grew
in size. While we often think of the State, or any
organizational body, as being either at war or at
peace, it seems that no such complete division
between war and peace is very useful to the State,
as expressed in Figure 1. A shaky ‘balance of
power’ (i.e., peace) is compromised by the way in
which people and institutions are ready to jump
on ‘the warpath,’ when it appears that a new cycle,
precipitated by economic or political duress, is in
the making.
The next two sections provide functional
explanations for the existence of a professional
military, and a third section provides an evolution-

Table 2: Functions of the Modern Nation State Military.

In 1725, Massachusetts ordered Boston newspapers not to print anything related to military activities without seeking
governmental consent (Wiggins 1956:94).
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Figure 1: The Warpath.
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For a key to symbols see Stepp, this volume, Appendix D. There exists an ever-present potential source of war in the ‘balance of
power’–a world-society type of pluralism. With a shaky balance of power, even arms speculation can give impetus to start on ‘the
warpath.’ Starting in the middle of the figure, the triad of the President/Congress-military-intelligence community is constrained
by the ‘western system of alliances,’ as well as by the tradition of ‘development of underdevelopment,’ which is the world capitalist
system’s reliance on permanently feudalistic and non-capitalistic relations of production. Shaded areas represent changes or evolution
in the nature of a population or institution. Countries targeted for underdevelopment can be the focus of: 1) U.S. propaganda of
legitimizing a puppet government through democracy; 2) an unequal trade relationship; or 3) an extremely exploitative relationship
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
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with capitalist institutions, which often results in riots, revolution, and other reasons for the U.S. to go to war, or provide a counterinsurgency. The president is influenced somewhat by the press because of reporting, but this influence owes mostly to the press’
role as a filter of public opinion. ‘Fighting potential’ is of concern to both the President and the Press. The Press becomes an ally
to military intelligence by criticizing foreign governments and maintaining jingoistic hype in order to increase revenues. When a
country (regional power, revolutionary country, etc.) is engaged by the U.S. in war, they return to the ‘balance of power’ through a
portal, either as part of the ‘western system of alliances’ (mostly industrialized countries) or the ‘development of underdevelopment’
(mostly 3rd world countries). The ‘warpath’ is joined by the U.S. governmental institutions, the press, and, eventually, the public.
This model provides for dissipation of the ‘warpath’ through sinks.
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Table 3: Rankings of Nuclear Capabilities4.

ary bases for such an institution.

mind. One is the construction of public works
and reclamation projects, for example by the Army
Wartime and Peacetime Military Functions
Corps of Engineers. Second, in the U.S., The NaAlthough it is sometimes difficult to distin- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
guish between wartime and peacetime functions, provides civilian services by mapping coastlines,
as can be seen in Figure 1, Table 2 attempts such as well as by assisting scientists in environmental
a delineation for the modern military.
research. These also serve the informational needs
Hyperfunctional explanations for the exis- of the military.
tence of the military are common. For example,
Another military effect is technological–most
it is argued that not only does military power help modern civilian technologies are the hand-memaintain international hierarchies (Tables 3 and downs from military research and development.
4), it also becomes a resource sink for states that From intelligence have come such technologies as
must deal with the problem of surplus capacity for e-mail, LSD, radar and sea-bottom charts, weather
production (e.g., Schumpeter 1950; Wallerstein and low-altitude satellites, rockets, lasers, global
1974). However, not all expenditures should be positioning systems, remote sensing and geographic
seen only as ‘unproductive’ employment of surplus information systems. From non-intelligence techpersonnel and equipment within the military, nologies have come jeeps (4x4s), canned-ham,
since at least two productive capacities come to
Table 4: Rankings of National Military Resource Dedication for 19954.

Source: US Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, internet address: www.acda.gov/wmeat/

4
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dehydrated foods, vacuum-packed wrapping, etc.
Arguably, the most important non-wartime
service provided by the military is that of protecting shipping and trade routes. Not the slightest
fraction of present materials could flow through
the world system without the existence of military
forces, especially those of the U.S.
The military also performs a display function
for the state, attaining public recognition through
parades, bands and burials, as well as ‘showing off’
by having a presence in foreign countries. In addition, in most societies, the military absorbs the
reserve of young (age-graded) males, who might
otherwise disrupt society with aggression, through
competition with adults for land or productive
responsibility, or by competing with older males
for mates.

Vol. 3 1999

between citizens of different countries, especially
given the increasingly global character of information, migration and contacts. Tables 3 and 4 show
a method, though perhaps artificial, of ascribing
rank amongst world citizens in a type of world
pluralism5. For instance, public perception of the
strength of a foreigner’s country affects how a person
may be seen vis-a-vis citizens of other countries. A
passport-bearer from a militarily powerful country
generally will not be turned away in most places as
easily as someone who presents a passport issued by
a militarily weak country. Tables 3 and 4 are expressions of potential power. How this information (in
numbers or in actual, physical presence) might be
consumed, received, or perceived by citizens and
functionaries of various countries is of strategic
importance to the U.S. government.

World Military Rankings
In addition to being an institution of social Non-State and State Military Comparisons
Table 5 compares the content, construct
organization, as just noted, military intimidation functions as a source of symbolic interaction and effects of war under different types of societal
Table 5: Aspects of War vis-a-vis Societal Organization.

Other possibilities for this ascribed status include: G-7/G-15/G-22 or UN Security Council membership, preeminence of
educational or other cultural institutions (art, press, television, entertainment, etc.).
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organization, presenting a role for information in
the evolution of military organization.
Such has been the case with the development of a
Note that the goals of the modern Nation universal [inter]state system paralleling the growth
State in Table 5 do not include ‘expand empire’. of capitalist institutions during the modern period.
This is due to the emergence of a global system of Pressures to professionalize also occurred earlier in
autonomous states, where all geographic areas are societal development when populations grew and
identified with State-level political organization. there became a need for a pan-societal mechanism
Van Creveld characterizes this situation as follows: of integration as powerful as the military (Service
1971; Carter 1977). Table 6 elaborates this idea,
1789 marked the beginning of a period when it
and distinguishes the point at which a society has
became possible, even fashionable, to overthrow
developed the military as a full-fledged indepenkings wholesale. As this process took hold,
dent institution. In the descriptions presented in
the sanctity that had attached to dynasties was
Table 6, almost all categories show clear differences
gradually transformed to national borders, and
between State and non-State modalities of war,
for one state to grant right of passage to the forces
of another became tantamount to sacrilege. The
though the existence of warfare is noted in almost
new belief system solidified after the First World
all societies (Ember and Ember 1992).
War and grew into dogma after the Second when
As can be deduced from Tables 5 and 6, the
it was also enshrined into international law. This
nature of warfare has changed in both tactical and
made it extraordinarily difficult to use war as
strategic realms. Development of tactical operaan instrument for altering borders; where the
tions, or battlefield practices, is affected most by
territorial integrity of one state is violated, all
others feel themselves threatened. (van Creveld
technology. Strategic questions, or battle plans,
1991: 215)
also have witnessed technological breakthroughs,
most recently in the technologies of nuclear, bioThis resignation to a system of legitimate units logical and electronic warfare. In the end, the
of competing interests resembles the realpolitik role of information in tactical and strategic matadvocated and followed by U.S. Secretary of State ters is increasingly important for the professional
Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s. It can also be military, especially compared with non-State
noted in the shaky ‘balance of power’ shown in war-making bodies.
Figure 1. Clearly, the impetus for formation of a
fighting force was not born with the Nation State. The Military as an Informational Environment
Nonetheless, professionalization of a fighting force Command, Control, Correspondence and
is likely to occur when a nation faces many wars. Intelligence
Command and control of troops are basic to
Table 6: Comparison of Nation State and non-State Modalities of War6.

Based on Turney-High, cited in Hallpike (1988:102-4).

6
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military battlefield tactics, as well as to long-term
strategy. Key to both command and control, as
well as to correspondence and intelligence, are
the identifying markers which denote place and
responsibility for every individual in the military.
Advancement in the hierarchy means a pay raise,
an increase in skill, an increase in prestige, and,
typically, an increase in the number of people for
whom you are responsible. As sheer military force
proves to be inadequate in some theaters of war/
conflicts, what have become more important are
communication and intelligence. Long-distance
communication is especially crucial, as is the analysis of the glut of data provided by intelligence and
information gathering techniques.
Hutchins’ (1995:372) model for cognition in
a social setting (e.g., a naval ship) includes the development of the practitioner, development of the
practice, and conduct of the practice. In Hutchins’
application of this model to the military, development of the practitioner results in specialization
and increase in status in small, graded increments,
based on glamour, technology, destructive power,
extent of training, quality of people, and the difficulty involved in gaining entrance. Specialization
is not so extreme for officers as it is for the enlisted. Identity also is forged by encouraging some

Vol. 3 1999

units to think that other units in the command
are not as competent. Pride and confidence are
paramount to maintaining cohesion and identity,
with concomitant execution of responsibilities.
The conduct of the practice is governed by successive hierarchical responsibilities and witnessed in
the salute, uniforms and insignia that express the
just-mentioned delineation in status (Hutchins
1995). The development of the practice in the
U.S. is based on the division of labor between the
services, leader/soldier relationships of reciprocity,
and the operational requirements of the transport
and fighting arena, be it air, sea or land (Hutchins
1995; Allard 1991).
This model of information flow and cognition in the military can be used to organize future
research. Table 7 lists apparent gaps in past and
present studies of military intelligence. Points
one, two, five and six relate in different ways to
development of the practice and of the practitioner, while points three and four relate to conduct
of the practice.
Political/Defense/Intelligence ‘Faultlines’
Lord (1988) identifies three ‘faultlines’ affecting U.S. national security, which result from the relationships between information gathering, defense
considerations and relevant policy development: 1)

Table 7: Identified Gaps in Studies of Military Intelligence.
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Figure 2: Faultlines.

A synoptic sketch of the three main players at the center of Figure 1–the military, the intelligence community, and
politicians (Congress/President), based on Lord’s (1988) discussion of the “faultlines” which develop between these
institutions. These faultlines are depicted as wheels with differently shaped cogs. Sparks fly where the cogs meet.

political-military; 2) political-intelligence; and 3)
military-intelligence (Figures 2 & 3). Faultlines
develop because the president, a civilian leader, is
dedicated to domestic concerns, requiring disclosure, as well as foreign diplomacy, requiring secrecy.
The president attempts to influence contingency or
strategic planning through the National Security
Council, though this traditionally is the domain of
a War Department. In Figures 2 and 3, the absence
of an economic ‘wheel’ and economic faultlines is
due to this paradigm’s concern with Nation State
organization, and because economic contexts and
functions were already presented in Figure 1, ‘The
Warpath.’
Figures 2 and 3 are based on Lord’s (1988)
presentation of these faultlines/disjunctures in
the U.S. government’s national security structure. The three relevant government objectives
for national security are depicted: 1) ‘control by

military;’ 2) ‘activity through politics;’ and 3)
‘secrecy in intelligence.’
The political-military faultline appears in
Figure 3 as ‘subjective control7,’ owing to the fact
that the military influences civilian agencies and
planning (e.g., officers in the National Security
Council), and that politics influences internal
military affairs (e.g., officers becoming experts in
international relations). As noted earlier, however,
the ideal since the turn of the century has been
‘objective control,’ wherein the civilian bureaucracy
is separated from, but has total control over, the
military bureaucracy, which has exclusive control
over its own internal workings.
The political-intelligence faultline in Figures 2
and 3 starts with the CIA’s ‘objectivity,’ and results
in the agency often discounting or questioning administrative policy as biased. This faultline recently
has created ‘competitive analysis,’ with several agen-

This term and “objective control” come from Samuel Huntington (Lord 1988:45). “Subjective” refers to the mutual influence of the military and the government on each others policy and internal workings. “Objective” refers to the separation
of the military and government in terms of internal workings, where overall policy objectives are set by the government
and followed by the military.

7
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cies submitting competing intelligence estimates,
rather than the CIA exercising hegemony over the
final report for the National Intelligence Council.
The military-intelligence faultline in Figures
2 and 3 is exhibited by: 1) military distrust of the
CIA’s ability to provide adequate intelligence; 2)
CIA hegemony over information analysis; 3) technology determining policy rather than vice-versa;
and 4) a lack of adequate counter-intelligence,
especially within military intelligence agencies. In
addition, surveillance work is not always well-paid,
nor exciting and, as van Creveld states, people
always can be “outwitted, bribed or subverted”
(1991:211).
Within the political wheel, the president does
not lie at the center because Congress is another
source of power, as are the Defense Department
and Department of State (largely under presidential control, but having their own traditions).
Also, informational campaigns for democracy by
the United States Information Agency, Voice of
America (or Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Marti), often are not in the State Department’s
interest of maintaining good bilateral relations
(Lord 1988:51). This ‘la la land,’ an attributed,
mythological reality, is comprised of fairly autonomous agencies devoted almost entirely to patriotic
propaganda.
Conclusion
The military is one of the basic social megainstitutions in the Nation State (e.g., Cohen 1991).
States have always been concerned with control.
As Allard (1991:236) states, “Over any significant length of time, the pluralistic nature of the
American civil system is more likely to favor the
institution than the individual.” Pluralism exists
in all states, though this means that political safety
valves and continual outlets for ethnic tension and
mass discontent also are required (Cohen 1994).
Warfare, patriotic public displays, and jingoistic
journalism against other countries also serve this
end (Figure 1). Within the State, surveillance and
military intelligence are involutional developments,
resulting partly from the disintegrating possibili-
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ties of pluralism and information entropy, where
different epistemological fields (i.e., worldviews) of
different ethnic groups and professional identities
collide and compete. Given this fact, the military
and its related institutions may well be as fundamental to State functioning as the political realm.
The development of military intelligence in
the U.S. since the late 1800s involved centralization, autonomy, direct accountability to war
chiefs, intermittent civilian control, decreasing
antagonism with the press, and the integration of
the different armed forces. These developments
have been made possible and shaped by the use
of a ‘least common denominator’ approach to
communication, which encompasses all interservice, intraservice and civilian/military distinctions
mentioned in the introduction. The distinctions
within the military illustrate that the most effective modes of information transmission within an
organization are not always the same as the most
effective modes of transmission between organizations. Future research might examine types of
communication, and their effectiveness, within
and between intelligence or military organizations
at different places and times.
This effort to contextualize the study of military intelligence traces the role of information in
the history and development of the U.S. military
and the development of the U.S. as a polity in the
world system. The communication between the
tactical systems of the armed services has improved
in the past 25 years, but the biggest threat to effective
and efficient military operations in the U.S. is still
the coordination and analysis of information (Allard 1991:16). Thus, even though weapons systems
procurement, organization for war, and distribution
of power are also the prerogatives of each individual
service branch, it is information that remains the
most important variable in the evolution of this
component of the human ecosystem.
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Figure 3. Faultlines (explicated).

Vol. 3 1999

Partially explicated view of Figure 2; intelligence agencies denoted by the eye in the peak of the consumer symbols. All answer
to the CIA/Director of Central Intelligence. Prior analytical hegemony exercised by the CIA can (and presently does) give
way to competitive analysis of intelligence information by other agencies in forming the National Intelligence Estimates.
Most of the flows are informational, excepting Congress’ impetus towards sinking money into defense and technology,
presumably to absorb surplus capacity for production. The dialectical field between military officers and their troops (who
resemble kites), designates the contradictions wherein soldiers oriented toward group solidarity and devotion are forced
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/3 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.3
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through a system requiring professionalism, organization and impersonality. Similarly, officers who believe in, and
have a duty to, their subordinates are required to manage their troops through manipulative integration instead of
simple dominance (Buck 1981). Whereas sparks flew where the cogs met in Figure 2, the meeting of these institutions has more specific results. Distrust develops between the military and intelligence spheres, competition over
information control develops between the political and intelligence spheres, and politicized control of the military
results from the relationships developed between the political and military spheres.
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